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PROBLEM  DEFINITION:
We are given n publishers (1< i ≤ n), m advertisers(1 < j ≤ m) 
and an auctioneer  such that:
■   advertisers j have budgets  Bj and bid  bij on ad slot i.
■   vij is the valuation of advertiser j for slot i.
■   Pij is the truthful second price charged to advertiser j for slot i.
■     each publisher has only one slot.
■ publishers set a reserve price  Ri for the slot on their website.
■ each publisher’s objective is to maximize ad slot revenue.
■ each advertiser’s objective is to maximize surplus.
Auctioneer's Goal:  truthful allocation and  ad slot prices to 
maximize publishers' revenue and advertisers' social welfare  ?
ABSTRACT:
■ The Google AdSense Program is a successful internet advertisement 
program where Google places contextual adverts on third-party 
websites and shares the resulting revenue with each publisher.
■ Advertisers have budgets and bid on ad slots while publishers set  
reserve prices for the ad slots on their websites. 
■ Following previous modelling efforts[1], we model the program as a 
two-sided market  with advertisers on one side and publishers on the 
other. 
■ We show a reduction from the Generalised Assignment Problem
(GAP) to the problem of computing the revenue maximising 
allocation and pricing of publisher slots under a first-price auction.
■ GAP is APX-hard but a (1-1/e) approximation is known [2].
■ We compute truthful and revenue-maximizing prices and 
allocation of ad slots to advertisers under a second-price auction.
■ The auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal
SOLUTION CONCEPT:
■ We consider the centralized auctioneer or publisher-optimal solution 
concept which maximizes the total revenue of the publishers / 
auctioneer.
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AUCTIONEER'S GOAL: 
REDUCTION FROM GAP (APPROX-GAP):
Given m objects and n knapsacks, we show a reduction from GAP 
[2] as follows:
■ Each advertiser is a knapsack and the size of the knapsack 
is the advertiser’s budget Bj .
■ The adspend vij on each ad slot is the object size.  We remove 
objects i with vij < Ri for all j and assign the remaining as 
follows:
■ Our objective is to assign objects to knapsacks so as to 
maximize the total size or profit of the objects without
exceeding the size of each knapsack.
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TRUTHFUL & 
REVENUE-MAXIMIZING AUCTION:
■ Phase 1: Revenue Maximization
■ Exclude each advertiser j from the auction.
■ Run APPROX-GAP [2] to compute the 2nd price vector 
of advertiser j.
■ Phase 2: Winner Determination
■ Advertiser j demands a set S
j
 of ad slots.
■ Obtain IP relaxation of combinatorial allocation (CA-IP).
■ Prove allocation monotonicity for known-single 
minded, additive valuation (v
j
) bidders.
■ Obtain convex decomposition of fractional allocation 
into polynomially-many l integral vectors [3].
■ Satisfy all bids with x
lj
 = 1 with probability λ
l  
based 
on the integral vectors obtained from the decomposition.
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WINNER DETERMINATION (CA-IP):
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK:
■ The  auctioneer's revenue is within (1-1/e) second-price optimal.
■  Our model can be extended for online or incomplete information.
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